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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
In the field of domestic relations during 1955 the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia passed on two cases dealing with
the problem of desertion, one with the problem of the custody
of children following a divorce, one with the enforcement of a
property settlement in lieu of alimony against the estate of the
decedent husband, and one with the application of Virginia's
miscegenation statute.
Divorce-Desertion. Failure To Object To Spouse's
Departure No Bar To a Suit for Divorce. In the case of
Miller v. Miller,' appellant husband brought a suit for divorce
a mensa et thoro on the grounds of desertion under Virginia
Code Section 20-95 (1950).2 The court below dismissed the bill
on the ground that the evidence tended to prove a separation by
mutual consent. The issue on appeal was whether the evidence
established a desertion by respondent wife, or a separation by
mutual consent.
The evidence was taken by deposition and was uncontroverted. Although the wife was personally served with process,
she filed no answer and offered no evidence. The wife was represented by counsel when depositions were taken, but her counsel
neither cross-examined the husband's witness nor appeared on
appeal.
The parties were married in 1942 and resided in the husband's house until August 21, 1952, when the wife removed her
clothing to her sister's house. The wife returned later with her
brother-in-law and an assistant to remove the rest of her personal
effects. Four persons testified on behalf of the husband: the
husband himself, his son, the wife's brother-in-law, and the assistant. The substance of the testimony was that the wife had
voiced an intention to leave her husband and not to return. None
of the witnesses knew of any reason for her leaving. The testimony also indicated that the husband had offered no objection
when his wife departed.
1 Miller v. Miller, 196 Va. 698, 85 S.E.2d 221 (1955).
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Va. Code S20-95 (1950): "A divorce from bed and board may be decreed

for cruelty, reasonable apprehension of bodily harm, abandonment, or
desertion."

The trial court held that the evidence tended to prove a
separation by mutual consent, relying primarily on the husband's failure to make any objection when his wife left him.
In addition, the fact that the wife had filed no answer, had offered no evidence, and that her counsel had not cross-examined
the witnesses during the taking of the depositions appears to have
been persuasive.
The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed and remanded on
the ground that the uncontroverted evidence established a desertion entitling the husband to a divorce.3 The court reaffirmed
the rule laid down in the first divorce case based on desertion to
reach the Supreme Court of Appeals, where it was said:
Desertion is a breach of matrimonial duty, and is composed first, of the actual breaking off of the matrimonial
cohabitation, and secondly, an intent to desert in the mind of
the offender. Both must combine to make the desertion
complete ... Under our statute, no particular period is decontinue to entitle a
scribed in which the desertion shall
4
party to a divorce a mensa et thoro.
The court added:
In the many cases since that time that rule has not been
changed but its application has resulted in a denial or a
granting of a divorce according to the facts of each case.
One aspect of the Miller case decision which makes it noteworthy is the determination that the failure of the husband, the
deserted party, to voice an objection to his wife's departure was
irrelevant, since:
... it was her conduct and purpose and not his state of
mind that determined 'whether there 'was desertion. He
was not required then or thereafter to make an offer of
reconciliation if she in fact deserted him. Code §20-102.
[Emphasis added]

a Desertion is the voluntary separation of one married party from the other
without any justification either in the consent or the wrongful conduct
of the other. Bailey v. Bailey, 21 Gratt. (62 Va.) 43 (1871); Sussman
v. Sussman, 158 Va. 382, 163 S.E. 69 (1932).
4
Bailey v. Bailey, 21 Gratt. (62 Va.) 43,47 (1871).

Prior to the enactment in 1938 of the present Virginia Code
Section 20-102 (1950),1 the rule had been established by case law
that it was generally necessary for the deserted party to make a
bona fide offer of reconciliation before a divorce suit for desertion could be maintained.0 The statute removed the necessity of
such an offer of reconciliation in all desertion cases. Under the
interpretation in the Miller case the policy of the statute was extended; not only was the husband not required to make an offer
of reconciliation, but also his failure to object to his wife's departure did not jeopardize his suit if she .in fact deserted him.
Without such an interpretation of this statute, a strong presumption of separation by mutual consent would normally result from
the husband's silence.
Corroboration Necessary To Establish a Divorce for
Desertion. Another noteworthy aspect of the Miller decision
concerns the kind and amount of corroboration necessary to support a divorce for desertion. This issue undoubtedly raises serious problems for the members of the bar, for it is provided by
statute that:
...the bill shall not be taken for confessed, nor shall a
testimony of the
divorce be granted on the uncorroborated
7
parties or either of them;...
In the Miller case, the testimony of the husband was corroborated
by three witnesses in these three essential respects: (1) wife's
statement of an intent to leave and not to return, (2) the actual
separation, and (3) no known wrongful conduct on husband's
part justifying her desertion. This was held to be-sufficient corroboration.
The case of Graves v. Graves8 contains the most comprehensive statement of the kind and amount of evidence necessary
GVa. Code S20-102 (1950): "It shall not be necessary, in any suit for
divorce from the bond of matrimony or from bed and board upon the
ground of abandonment or desertion, to allege or prove an offer of
reconciliation."
I Walker v. Walker, 120 Va. 410, 91 S.E. 180 (1917); Sussman v. Sussman,
158 Va. 382, 385, 386, 163 S.E. 69 (1932); Inman v. Inman, 158 Va. 597,
603, 604, 164 S.E. 383 (1932).
7 Va. Code S20-99 (1950).
8 Graves v. Graves, 193 Va. 659, 661, 662, 70 S.E.2d 339 (1952).

to corroborate the testimony of the complaining spouse. The
court stated:
The question of corroboration is one of fact, the decision
of which in each case depends upon the peculiar facts of that
particular case. It is not necessary that the testimony of the
complaining spouse be corroborated on every element or
essential charge stated as a ground for divorce. The corroborative testimony need not be sufficient, standing alone,
to prove the alleged ground for divorce. Any other rule
would deprive the testimony of the complaining spouse of
any practical effect. The general rule is that where a particular fact or circumstance is vital to complainant's case,
some evidence of the same, in addition to the complainant's
ownr testimony, is essential. The main object of the provision of the statute requiring corroboration is to prevent
collusion. Where it is apparent that there is no collusion,
the corroboration need only be slight. Forbes v. Forbes,
182 Va. 636, 29 S.E.2d 829; [Emphasis added]
The court in the Graves case then quoted with approval a
part of the decision in Martin v. Martin,9 in which Mr. Justice
Holt said:
Corroboration rests in the facts and circumstances of each
case. Only those facts necessary to the judgment must be
supported. "Confirmation is not necessary for that removes
.all doubt, while corroboration only gives more strength than
was had before." . . . It need not rest in the testimony of

witnesses but may be furnished by surrounding circumstances adequately established. [Emphasis added]
It is submitted that the rule set out in the Graves case is not
altogether without ambiguity, especially insofar as the "general
rule" conflicts with the statement that "It is not necessary that
the testimony of the complaining spouse be corroborated on
every element or essential chargestated as a ground for divorce."
Because of this ambiguity the practitioner should attempt to
corroborate the client's testimony with respect to all the operative
facts of the case. In general, in the case of a desertion, these
operative facts would indicate: (1) the actual separation, (2) the
9 Martin v. Martin, 166 Va. 109, 116, 184 S.E. 220 (1936).
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intent to remain separated, corroborated either through statements of the deserting spouse of an intention not to return, as in
the Miller case, or by inference from a long-continued separation,
(3) no justification for the desertion either in (a) the consent of
the complainant, or (b) the wrongful conduct of the complainant
justifying a desertion, and (4) with a divorce a vinculo, the period
of separation.
Numerous cases which have dealt with the problem of
corroboration are set out in the margin, 10 illustrating the operative
facts which have required corroboration in divorce suits for desertion.
10 Corroboration for divorce a vinculo on grounds of desertion:
H v. W (uncontested). No inference of intent to desert from continuous absence of 4 years. Testimony of H, corroborated by two
witnesses, established that W had left without cause other than that she
was tired of H, that H had been a good husband and.had provided for
W as best he could. Held: insufficient corroboration on wilfulness of
desertion; no offer of reconciliation. This case is out of line with the
other decisions on the issue of corroboration. Walker v. Walker, 120
Va. 410, 91 S.E. 180 (1917).
H v. W (uncontested). H cohabited with W for one day before
entering the army; W returned to her family and refused to cohabit
with H following his discharge one year later. H's testimony as to
W's intent to desert corroborated by one witness who said that he saw
a letter from W stating an intention not to return. Letter, the "best
evidence", not produced. Held: insufficient corroboration (hearsay),
no evidence to show when desertion occurred. Owens v. Owens, 197
Va. 681, 90 S.E.2d 776 (1956).
H v. W (uncontested). Desertion for 28 years. Testimony of H,
corroborated by four disinterested witnesses, established Ws willful
desertion and abandonment, H's lack of fault. Held: sufficient corroboration. Lamb v. Lamb, 126 Va. 256, 101 S.E. 223 (1919).
W v. H (uncontested). Desertion for one year. Testimony of W
as to willful desertion and H's irresponsibility and failure to provide for
W corroborated by two neighbors. Held: sufficient corroboration.
Dinsmore v. Dinsmore, 128 Va. 403, 104 S.E. 785 (1920).
W v. H (uncontested). Desertion for 12 years. No witnesses present
at separation or when W sought a reconciliation, but W's statements on
these particulars were "frank and full". Corroboration of intention to
desert inferred from long-continued absence. Corroboratign by three
disinterested witnesses but only as to W's exemption from fault, H's
mistreatment and neglect of her and W's attempts to reconcile their differences. Held: sufficient corroboration. Grim v. Grim, 126 Va. 245,
101 S.E. 140 (1919).
Corroboration for divorce a mensa et thoro on ground of desertion:
W v. H (uncontested). Separation for two years. Ws testimony
corroborated by her mother and father, established that H left without
cause. (H's purported reason for leaving: W allegedly contracted ex-

Right of Husband To Select Place of Abode. In Nash v.
Nasb, 1 respondent wife filed a bill for divorce under Virginia
Code Section 20-95,12 alleging husband's desertion without cause
and non-support. Her prayer was for a divorce a mensa et tboro,
suit money, and alimony. Appellant husband answered, denying
the allegations of the bill, and filed a cross-bill alleging wife's desertion without cause. His prayer was for a divorce a mensa et
tboro.
The trial court awarded the wife a divorce a mensa and alimony. The only issue on appeal was the sufficiency of the evidence to support the decree, the husband's cross-bill not having
been urged before the court.
Testimony was taken by deposition and presented little conflict. The parties had been married for twenty-six years, but
during the nine years preceding the suit the wife had lived at
Pamplin, Virginia with her mother, with the husband's tacit consent, while the husband lived in Honaker, Virginia, at the place of
his employment. The husband visited his wife every other weekend during this period, and contributed to her support. A discessive debts on an account for food and clothing.)
corroboration.

Held: sufficient

Good v. Good, 122 Va. 30, 94 S.E. 176 (1917).

W v. H (uncontested). Separation for 20 months. Ws testimony
corroborated "by several neighbors and friends," established desertion
and no resumption of marital duties, failure of H to support W. Held:
sufficient corroboration. Bowman v. Bowman, 180 Va. 200, 22 S.E.2d

.29 (1942).
W v. H (uncontested).

W testified that H married her for her

money, exhausted her bank account, wilfully deserted her. Corroboration on all points by Ws sister and niece. Held: sufficient corroboration. Ciarochi v. Ciarochi, 194 Va. 313, 73 S.E2d 402 (1953).

H v. W (contested, W filed cross-bill alleging desertion of H).
Testimony of W that H beat her and cursed her, wilfully left her
without cause or justification corroborated by three adult children,

son-in-law, and several disinterested witnesses. Held: sufficient corroboration, divorce a mensa awarded t W. Prindes v. Prindes, 193 Va.
463, 69 SY..2d 332 (1952).
W v. H (contested, H filed cross-bill alleging desertion of W).

H and W both testified that their marital relations were broken off
before W left H, uncorroborated. H's testimony that W drank ex-

cessively and ran around with other men prior to the time that she left
him corroborated by "several witnesses", all disinterested. Held: sufficient corroboration, divorce a mena awarded H. Allen v. Allen,
11

188 Va. 717, 51 S.E.2d 207 (1949).
Nash v. Nash, 197 Va. 465, 89 S-E.2d 917 (1955).

12See note 2 supra.

agreement arose in 1952 over some trivial matter, and the husband ceased his weekend visits to his wife, but left with her several checks, signed in blank, which the wife refused to use.
Seven months after the disagreement, the wife's attorney
wrote to the husband, suggesting an informal, but permanent arrangement for monthly contributions for the wife's support.
Husband, by his attorney, replied that he was prepared to furnish
both the wife and her mother with suitable accommodations :at
Honaker if they would live with him, and that if his wife should
fail to join him, "she must assume the consequences of her failure
to do so." This request, and numerous other similar proposals
made on other occasions, were refused without justification other
than that the wife preferred to live with her mother.
On this evidence, the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed
the award of a divorce a mensa and alimony to the wife and dismissed the bilL
Non-support during the continuance of a separation by
mutual consent was probably the only theory on which the wife
might successfully have maintained a suit for divorce, since the
husband was under no duty to visit his wife, and the cessation of
his visits did not amount to willful desertion on his part. The
husband however, established that he had left the signed checks
with his wife, which she had authority to use, thereby refuting
the wife's allegations of non-support.
Until the husband sent his wife the letter stating his willingness to provide a home in Honaker for her and her mother, the
parties had been living apart by consent. This letter amounted to
a revocation of that consent, for the husband provided that his
wife should either live with him or "assume the consequences"
of her refusaL Upon refusing this offer, the wife was placed in
the position of the deserting spouse, for the court recognized the
well-settled principle that the husband has the right to select the
place of abode, so long as his choice is not unreasonable.
The fact situation falls directly within the doctrine of the
Grraes decision, in which the court said:
I Robinette v. Robinette, 153 Va. 342, 149 SJE. 493 (1929); Kerr v. Kerf, 182

Va. 731, 30 S.E.2d 684 (1944); Graves v. Graves, 193 Va. 659, 661; 70

S.E.2d 339, 340 (1952).

While the relation of husband and wife has been modified
in many respects by statute, a husband still has the right to
select the place of abode and a wife must acquiesce in such
selection, providing the decision of the husband is not unreasonable, arbitrary and unjust, and not used 14as a means
of procuring a dissolution of the marital relation.
Although the wife had no case, the husband clearly had made
out all the elements for a divorce a mensa.15 Since the issue of the
husband's cross-bill was not urged on appeal, the court merely
reversed the decision below and dismissed the case.
The Nasb case is noteworthy in one respect. It demonstrates
the importance of introducing carefully drafted letters as corroborative evidence. The husband's letter in the Nash case and
the wife's subsequent acts corroborated his testimony with respect to the husband's lack of consent to a continued separation,
the wife's refusal of the offer contained in the letter established
her intent to desert, and her refusal to join her husband in Honaker after receiving the letter established her desertion. This was,
in effect, the strongest single piece of evidence in the husband's
case.
In the leading case of Commonwealth v. Rutberfoord,16 '
which dealt with the right of a wife married to and living
amicably with a Virginia resident to maintain (at least for tax
purposes) a domicile in another state, the court recognized that
there were limits to the derogation by statute of the common law
unity of husband and wife. The court said in dictum:
...

the statutory invasion of the fiction (of the common

law unity of husband and wife), certainly in this State, has
broken it down as far as the political, civil and property
rights of the wife are involved, but as to the domestic relations it is, at least in part, preserved and it ought to be. [Emphasis added]
14 Graves v. Graves, 193 Va. 659, 661; 70 S.E.2d 339, 340 (1952).

15 (1) W's refusal to join H after he revoked his consent to live separately
amounted to desertion. (2) The intent to remain separated was inferred from her refusal to live with H at Honaker. (3) There was no
justification for the desertion, either (a) in H's consent, since that had
been revoked by the letter, (b) in the wrongful conduct of H justifying a desertion or in H's selection of Honaker as a place of abode.
16 Commonwealth v. Rutherfoord, 160 Va. 524, 536, 169 S.E. 909 (1933).

The Nasb and Graves cases represent one line of authority
establishing an aspect of the marital relationship over which the
husband still retains control-the right to choose the place of
abode.
Custody: Power of the Court To Redetermine the Right
To Custody of Minor Children Contra To Separation Agreement; Foreign Adjudication Not Binding. Florence v. Florence,17 involved the rights of the mother and father to the custody of their two minor children. The suit was originally brought
by the mother, in August, 1952, to construe and enforce a separation agreement giving her custody of both boys. A decree entered in 1953 gave sole custody of Robert, the elder son, to the
father; of James, the younger son, to the mother. By petition in
1954 the father re-opened the issue and the court awarded him
custody of both children. Whether this was error was the sole
issue on appeal.
The litigation between the parties followed a tangled course,
set out chronologically in the margin.'
The evidence produced in the June, 1954, hearing was extensive and conflicting, resulting in testimony "of the billingsgate
17 Florence v. Florence, 197 Va: 432, 90 S.E.2d 111 (1955).

18 Sequence of events in the Florence case:

Sept. '51: M and F entered into a separation agreement in Virginia
which dealt with their property rights and gave custody of both boys
to M.
Feb. '52: M secured a divorce in Pennsylvania.
Aug. '52: M brought suit in Virginia to construe and enforce the separation agreement.
Dec. '52: F married W2.
Apr. '53: M married H2 and moved to Nebraska with the boys while
the Virginia suit was still pending.
May '52: Interlocutory decree entered in Virginia suit of Aug. '52,
giving temporary custody of Robert to F, temporary custody of James
to M, restraining M from taking James out of court's jurisdiction.
'53: F went to Nebraska, secured custody of Robert by decree of a
Nebraska court.
Oct. '53: Final decree entered in Virginia suit of Aug. '52 following
hearing ore tenms, giving sole custody of Robert to F, sole custody of
James to M.
June '54: F filed petition in Virginia court, alleging M's lack of fitness
to have James. Testimony limited to period since Oct. '53, the date of
the former decree. Following extensive hearings, the court entered a
decree on August 10, awarding custody of both boys to F. The present
appeal was from this decree.

variety, asserted on one hand and denied on the other." It established, among other things, probable extra-marital indiscretions on
the part of the mother, the fact that James, who was with her, was
a problem child, that the mother's residence (converted into a
rooming house) was not a desirable environment for the boy, and
that with respect to the mother personally, "the evidence tended
to show a nature not always stable and disciplined, and a judgment not always sound."
The evidence also established that the father had a proper
home for the boys and was financially well able to care for them,
that they were most affectionate towards him, that their stepmother showed an interest in and affection for them, that Robert
was a well-adjusted child, and that both the home of the father
and the companionship of Robert should have a beneficial influence on James.
As a conclusion from this testimony, the trial court determined that the father was the proper person to have the custody of both boys, and entered a decree in accordance with this
finding.
In affirming this decree on appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals quoted from the opinion in Mullins v. Mullins:19
In Virginia, we have established the rule that the welfare
of the infant is the primary, paramount, and controlling consideration of the court in all controversies between parents
over the custody of minor children. All other matters are
subordinate ...The rights of neither parent take precedence
over the rights of the child. The welfare of the child is superior to the wishes and personal desires of either of them.
In considering their qualifications and fitness, we must look
to their adaptability to the task of caring for the child; their
ability to control and direct it; the age, sex, and health of
the child; its temporal and moral wellbeing, as well as the
environment and circumstances of its proposed home; and
the influences likely to be exerted over the child.
The rule of the Muilins case is the result of a substantial doctrinal evolution. Early Virginia cases recognized the English
common law rule that the father had an absolute right to the cus19 Mulins v. Mullins, 188 Va. 259, 269, 270,49 S.E2d 349, 354 (1948).

tody of his minor children.20 This common law right was
abridged in part by a statute, known as Mr. Justice Talfourd's
act, giving courts of equity broader discretion with respect to
the custody of children, although the paramount right of -he:
21
father to his issue was still recognized.
One line of authority made a distinction with respect to the
extent of the powers of the courts of equity. If the party with
custody of the child held under a claim of right, as in the Latbam
case 2 2 the court's discretion was restricted. If the party with,
custody of the child held under no claim of right, and the party
requesting custody of the child asserted a claim of right, as in
Armstrong v. Stone,"3 the court's discretion was broad and the
chancellor would consider the best interests of the child.
This broadening of the discretionary powers of the court of
equity began a process of erosion which undermined the father's
absolute right to custody. Another line of authority began to
recognize the best interests of the child as paramount even to the
claim of the father. 24 This judicial rule was soon firmly established,25 and was eventually codified.26
20

Latham v. Latham, 30 Gratt. (71 Va.) 307, 331 (1878).
21ld. at 332.
22 M v. F for custody of their children. Held: the children would not be
taken from F's custody unless he had shown himself totally unfit to care
for them. See note 20 supra.
28 M v. Grandparents who had custody of M's daughter. Held: for M.
The court would "exercise its own judgment as to what will be best
calculated to promote the interests of the child, having due regard to the
legal rights of the parties claiming the custody." Armstrong v. Stone,
9 Gratt. (50 Va.) 102 (1852).
24
When M died, F transferred his daughter to his sister-in-law. F brought
writ of habeas corpus to recover custody. Held: writ denied. "The
main consideration should be the best interests of the child." Coffee
and Wife v. Black, 82 Va. 567 (1866).
M, in her will, gave custody of her child to her sisters. In a contest
between F and the sisters, held: for the sisters. The welfare of the
child is the primary consideration. Stringfellow v. Somerville, 95 Va.
25 701, 29 S.E. 685 (1889).
Parish v. Parish, 116 Va. 476, 82 S.E. 119 (1914); Fleshood v. Fleshood,
144 Va. 767, 770, 130 SE. 648 (1925); Markley v. Markley, 145 Va.
596, 602, 134 SE. 536 (1926); Darnel v. Darnel, 179 Va. 86, 93, 18
SZE.2d 271 (1942); Elam v. Elam, 182 Va. 469, 472, 29 S.E.2d 222 (1944).
2
6Va. Code $31-15 (1950): ". . . In such case (when parents are separated)
or in any other case in which the parents are living apart, whether
partially or absolutely divorced or not, the court or judge or any court
of competent jurisdiction, in awarding the custody of the child to

Several aspects of the Florence case are of considerable interest. One problem, never commented on by the court but assumed at the outset, was the basis of the court's jurisdiction to
decide the issue of custody. This authority can be sustained on
one of two theories. First, the court of equity has an inherent
power over the subject matter of custody, irrespective of statutory provisions 2 7 that is derived from the common law of England, where "the chancellor, representing the king as parens
patriae,has jurisdiction to determine controversies concerning the
guardianship of a minor.. ." 28 Under such jurisdiction, the court
has a continuing power to change its decree if conditions warrant
such modification. Second, the jurisdiction is derived by statute.
Although this case does not come within the specific provisions of
Virginia Code Section 20-107 (1950)29 and Section 20-108
(1950),30 as is stated by the court, it does fall within the express
provisions of Virginia Code Section 31-15 (1950),8 which is apparently drafted on the theory that the equity court has inherent
power over the custody of children within its territorial jurisdiction.
The principal importance of the Florence case lies in its refusal to give the separation agreement any weight in redetermining the right to custody.
either parent or to some other person, shall give primary consideration
to the welfare of the child, and as between the parents there shall be no
presumption of law in favor of either ... "
27Latham v. Latham, supra, note 20 at 331: "It may be conceded it is
competent for a court of chancery, in pursuance of its general jurisdiction, for good and sufficient reasons, to make any proper order touching the custody and tuition of an infant;..."
28 Armstrong v. Stone, 9 Gratt. (50 Va.) 102, 105 (1852).
29 Va. Code S20-107 (1950): "Upon decreeing the dissolution of a marriage,
and also upon decreeing a divorce,... and upon decreeing that neither
party is entitled to a divorce the court may make such further decree
as it shall deem expedient concerning the ... care, custody, and maintenance of their minor children, and may determine with which of the
parents the children or any of them shall remain."
a0 Va. Code §20-108 (1950): "The court may, from time to time after de.creeing as provided in the preceding section, on petition of either of the
parents ... revise and alter such decree concerning the care, custody,
and maintenance of the children and make a new decree concerning
the same, as the circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the
children may require."
31 See note 26 supra.

At common law such agreements were void as against public
policy.82 One early Virginia case recognized a different rule
when a guardianship was given by agreement. The court did not
treat the contract as void, but irrelevant, and looked to the best
interests of the child.83 In Gloth v. Glotb,34 a separation agreement giving the minor child to the wife was incorporated in the
divorce decree. It was held that by statute (present Virginia
Code Section 20-108 (1950), supra at note 29), the court retained a continuing jurisdiction over custody that could not be
taken away by an agreement made part of the divorce decree.
The Florencedecision further clarifies the matter by holding
that the court still has jurisdiction even if the agreement of the
parents as to custody has never been incorporated in a divorce
decree. It is submitted that this decision is in line with the authority of the Coffee and Stringfellow cases.8 5
It will be noted that the Virginia court had taken jurisdiction over this controversy before the Nebraska court entered its
decree concerning the custody of the children. Having once
taken the issue, the Virginia court showed a reluctance to treat
the foreign adjudication as binding when there had been a substantial change of conditions subsequent to the foreign decree.
The rule upon which the Virginia court relies is in accord with
the recent Supreme Court decision of May v. Anderson,3 in
which Mr. Justice Frankfurter said in a concurring opinion:
Property, personal claims, and even the marriage status,...
generally give rise to interests different to those relevant to
the disclrge of the State's continuing responsibility to
children within her borders. Children have a very special
place in life which law should reflect . . . But the child's

welfare in a custody case has such a claim upon the State
that its responsibility is obviously not to be foreclosed by a
prior adjudication reflecting another State's discharge of its
responsibility at another time.
32

Westneath v. Westmeath, Jacob 126, 37 Eng. Rep. 797 (1821); Swift v.

Swift, 34 Beav. 266, 55 Eng. Rep. 637 (1865); Vansittart v. Vansittart,
4 Kay & J. 62, 70 Eng. Rep. 26 (1858); Hamilton v. Hector, L.R. 6
Ch. App. 701 (1871).
33
See note 24 supra.
34 Gloth v. Gloth, 154 Va. 511, 551, 153 S.E. 879 (1930).
35 See note 24 supra.
36 May v.Anderson,73 S.Ct. 840, 844, 845, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953).
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Virginia is thus committed to the policy that the best interests of the child shall be the controlling factor in any controversy over custody. Although such a policy may lead to as
many custody battles as there are jurisdictions to which the successful party may take the child,8 7 such a result still appears
preferable to any extended application of the Full Faith and
Credit clause to the problem of the custody of minor children.
Property Settlement: Specific Enforcement of a Property Settlement In Lieu of Alimony Against the Estate of
8
dealt
Decedent Husband. The case of Higgins v. McFarland"
with the right of the first wife to enforce against the estate of her
former husband, now deceased, a property settlement entered into
prior to their suit for divorce. The bill was brought against the
respondents, decedent's second wife and the administrator of his
estate, after they had refused to comply with the terms of the
agreement. The bill prayed that decedent's personal property and
realty, held by the decedent and his second wife as joint tenants
with rights of survivorship, be subjected to the payment of this
claim.
The chancellor sustained respondent's demurrer to the bill on
the ground that the suit was based on an agreement to obtain a
divorce by consent and was void as against public policy. The
issue on appeal was whether the demurrer was properly sustained.
These facts were admitted by the demurrer: McFarland and
his first wife were married in 1919 and separated in 1935. There
followed a fourteen year course of litigation between the parties
over their marital status, set forth in the margin.3 9
White v. White, 181 Va. 162, 24 S.E.2d 448 (1943).
88 Higgins v. McFarland, 196 Va. 889, 86 S.E.2d 168 (1955).
87

89 1935: H v. W for divorce in Virginia. Dismissed.

1937: H v. W for

divorce in Virginia. Dismissed. W declared the innocent party and

awarded alimony; 1940: H moved to North Carolina, secured an absolute divorce. 1940: W secured declaratory judgment in Virginia that
the North Carolina divorce decree was invalid in Virginia. Affirmed
on appeal. McFarland v. McFarland, 179 Va. 418, 19 S.E.2d 77 (1942).
1949: H v. W in Virginia for declaratory judgment that North Carolina
divorce decree be declared valid in Virginia, relying on Williams v.

North Carolina, 317 US. 287, 63 S. Ct. 207 (1942), and Williams v.
North Carolina, 325 US. 226, 65 S. Ct. 1092 (1944). While this case
was pending, H and W entered into a separation agreement, the subject of this suit.

As a means of resolving their marital difficulties, the wife and
husband entered into a property settlement on August 22, 1949,
by which McFarland agreed to assume a debt of $8,600 secured
by deed of trust on the wife's home, paying $59.74 each month.
In consideration for this, the wife accepted the property settlement in lieu of the alimony previously awarded her, surrendered
all other rights or claims upon her husband or his property, and
further promised that within thirty days she would institute and
prosecute to a conclusion a divorce proceeding in the Virginia
courts. The wife was granted a divorce on October 7, 1949, in
which the property settlement was "fully confirmed and approved and made a part of the decree" of the court.
McFarland complied with the terms of the agreement until
his death. Upon the refusal of the respondents to continue the
monthly payments, this suit was brought.
The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the decree sustaining the demurrer to the bill and remanded the suit for trial. Upon
reviewing the extensive litigation between McFarland and his
first wife, the court concluded that no public policy would have
been advanced by denying approval of the agreement in the
divorce proceeding. The court noted that this suit was based
on the decree of the court awarding the divorce, which had
confirmed and approved the agreement, and not merely on the
contract itself. The court indicated that the result would not
necessarily have been different had the suit been maintained on the
contract alone, since no reconciliation was possible under these
circumstances.
Having disposed of the public policy ground for sustaining
the demurrer below, the court considered the binding effect of
the property settlement. The act of the divorce court in approving the agreement, unlike a decree for alimony, did not
1949: W v. H for divorce in Virginia, pursuant to provision in the
separation agreement. Decree for W, agreement "confirmed, approved, and made a part of" the decree of divorce.
1953: H died. W2 and administrator of H's estate refused to comply
wth the terms of the property settlement contained in the separation
agreement. W brought suit for specific performance of the property
settlement.

create a lien upon the real estate of the husband, 40 but it did vest
41
the parties with the property rights therein stated.
When the divorce court, with all the facts before it, rendered
its decree in which the property settlement was approved, that
decree was res judicata on the validity of the agreement2 as to
McFarland. By an application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the "administrator and heirs" of McFarland were now precluded from attacking its validity.
The issue of the enforcement of property settlements approved in divorce decrees is still somewhat unsettled. Actions
for arrearages of monthly payments in lieu of alimony have been
sustained on a debt theory by an action in assumpsit for accrued
unpaid installments" or by securing a judgment for the unpaid
amount and docketing the judgment, which became a lien upon
the husband's realty. 44 Actions for property settlement consisting of lump payments have been sustained by an action at law
on the contract4 5 or, as in the principal case, by a bill in equity
for specific performance.
The decision of Higgins v. McFarland has many similarities
to the earlier case of Moore v. Crutchfield," in which a final
property settlement made by the husband and wife was approved
by the divorce decree. The husband was to make a lump sum
payment to the wife in final settlement of their property rights
three years after the divorce proceeding. The wife died while
the suit was still on the docket, and her administratrix brought
an action at law on the contract. In holding that the husband
must pay the stiplated amount to the wife's estate, the courts
said that the wife's death did not amount to a default on her part,
and that the contract was a "real" action which survived to the
wife's personal representative.
40Bray v. Landergren, 161 Va. 699, 172 S.E. 252 (1934); Isaacs v. Isaacs,
Guardian, 117 Va. 730, 86 S.E. 105 (1915).
41Barnes v. American Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 720, 130 S.E. 902 (1925).
42
Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 82 S.E.2d 553 (1954), Emmerson v.
Emmerson, 120 Md. 584, 87 A. 1033 (1913).
43 Newman v. McComb, 112 Va. 408, 71 S.E. 624 (1911).
44
DeHart v. DeHart, 164 Va. 455, 180 S.E. 307 (1935); Va. Code §8-388
(1950).
45 Moore v. Crutchfield, 136 Va. 20, 116 S.E. 482 (1923).
40 See Note 45 supra.
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Higgins v. McFarland is noteworthy in two respects. First,
taken with Moore v. Crutchfield, the two decisions stand for the
proposition that if the parties to a divorce proceeding enter into
a property settlement which is approved and made a part of the
decree of divorce, the agreement can be enforced for the benefit
of the wife or of her estate upon the death of either the husband
or the wife, unless the agreement provides that it is to terminate
upon the death of either party. Second, Higgins v. McFarland
establishes that in certain instances a property settlement entered
into prior to the institution of a suit for divorce, which provides
in part that one spouse is to prosecute a divorce proceeding, may
not violate public policy if the facts clearly establish that there is
no element of collusion and that a reconciliation is impossible.
The validity of the divorce decree approving the agreement cannot be collaterally attacked, and the agreement can be enforced.
Enforcement of Virginia's Miscegenation Statute. In
Naim v. Naim,47 respondent's wife, a white woman, brought suit
to annul her marriage to a Chinese. Suit was brought under Virginia Code Section 20-54 (1950),48 which is part of "An Act to
Preserve Racial Integrity", enacted and approved by the General
Assembly in 1924.
The trial court held the marriage void. The issue on appeal
was whether the marriage could be annulled solely on the ground
of the racial ineligibility of the parties to marry, the husband
contending that the provisions of Section 20-54 and the related
sections49 were beyond the power of the State to enact because
of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection
clauses.
v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 97 S.E.2d 749 (1955).
47Naim
48
Code of Virginia S20-54: "It shall hereafter be unlawful for any white

person in this state to marry any save a white person, or a person with
no other admixture of blood than white and American Indian. For the
purposes of this chapter, the term "white person" shall apply only to

such persons as have no trace whatever of any blood other than Caucasian; but persons who have one-sixteenth or less of the blood of the
American Indian and have no other Caucasian blood shall be deemed to
be white persons. All laws heretofore passed and now in effect regarding the intermarriage of white and colored persons shall apply to
marriages prohibited by this chapter."
49 Infra, at notes 50, 51, and 52.

The material facts were stipulated. The respondent, domiciled in Virginia, went to North Carolina with the appellant,
where they were married on June 26, 1952. After the marriage
the parties immediately returned to Norfolk, where they lived together as man and wife. It was conceded that they left the State
in an attempt to evade the Virginia law forbidding their marriage.
In affirming the decree of annulment, the Supreme Court of
Appeals construed the last sentence of Section 20-54, Virginia
Code (1950) as incorporating the provisions of Sections 20-57,50
20-58,5 1 and 20-59, which deal exclusively with marriages between white and colored persons. The term "colored person" is
defined in Section 1-14.P Such a reading of the interrelationship
of the sections of Title 20 seems in accord with the original legislative intente 4 and with the re-codification of the Code of Virginia
in 1950.
Since the Constitutional aspects of this case have been considered elsewhere in this review," they will not be treated here.
The question of the application of these statutes and the wisdom
of the legislative classification of races should not, however, be
ignored.
As statements of the public policy of Virginia on the issue of
miscegenous marriages, the court in the past has said:
50Va. Code $20-57 (1950): "All marriages between a white person and a
colored person shall be absolutely void without any decree of divorce
or other legal process."
51 Va. Code $20-58 (1950): "If any white person and colored person shall go
out of this state, for the purpose o being married, and with the intention of returning, and be married out of it, and afterwards return to
and reside in it, cohabiting as man and wife, they shall be punished as
provided in 520-59, and the marriage shall be governed by the same law
as if it had been solemnized in this State."
62 Va. Code S20-59 (1950): If any white person intermarry with a colored
n, or any colored person intermarry with a white person, he shall
brguilty of a felony and shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five years.
USVa. Code S 1-14 (1950): 'Every person in whom there is ascertainable
any Negro blood shall be deemed and taken to be a colored
n,...7
54 Qapter 371: An Act to preserve racial integrity, Acts ofAsembly,
1924, pp. 534-5.
ms See Constitutional Law, infra, p. 219.

Thus, that the preservation of racial integrity is the unquestioned policy of this State, and that it is sound and wholesome, cannot be gainsaid. 50
and:
There can be no question of the public policy of Virginia
with reference to miscegenation. 57
Although the fundamental public policy of Virginia has been
to prevent the intermarriage of whites and negroes, Section 20-54
has broader implications, for it makes it unlawful "for any white
person in this State to marry any save a white person, or a person
with no other admixture of blood than white and American Indian," and the term "white person" applies "only to such persons
as have no trace wbatever of any blood other than Caucasian."
[Emphasis added.]
It is submitted that a literal reading of this statute would
permit the invalidation of a marriage by any disgruntled spouse
who, through a careful investigation of the ancestors of his
spouse, was able to discover any trace of non-Caucasian blood
(other than that of the American Indian). Is it the public policy
of Virginia to invalidate a marriage because one spouse has onesixteenth, or for that matter, one-two hundred and fifty sixth part
Mongolian blood? Such an example appears ridiculous on its
face, but a literal reading of the statute would permit no other
result.
For a more realistic problem, doubtless many men in the
armed services have returned or will return to this State with
wives whose blood is entirely or partially non-Caucasian. Is it
the legislative intent to invalidate those marriages5 8 and to hold
the parties criminally liable as felons? 59 This result is clearly implied in Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corporation,;" where
the court said:
'mWood v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 963, 965, 166 S.E. 477 (1932).
.7 Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp., 173 Va. 425, 434, 4 S.E2d 364

(1939).
58 Va. Code S20-57 (1950). See note 50 supra.
59
Va. Code 120-59 (1950). See note 52 supra.
60 173 Vaw 425, 429, 4 S.E.2d 364, 365 (1939).
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The general rule throughout the civilized world is that the
law of the place of its celebration governs as to the forms
and ceremonies incident to marriage. Thus arises the often
cited rule that a marriage valid where celebrated is valid
everywhere. But to this rule there are two well recognized
exceptions, as universal as the rule itself, namely: (1) Marriages deemed contrary to the laws of nature as generally
recognized in Christian countries, such as polygamous and
incestuous marriages; and (2) marriagespositively forbidden
by statute because contrary to local public policy. [Emphasis added]
The Toler case dealt with a bigamous marriage, celebrated in
West Virginia, where such marriages are voidable, but not void.
Sometime after their marriage the parties became domiciled in
Virginia, where the husband was killed in an industrial accident.
The wife's claim for compensation from the Industrial Commission as decedent's widow was disallowed on the ground that the
marriage was void. In affirming the order of the Industrial Commission, the Supreme Court of Appeals in dictum compared the
two Virginia statutes relating to bigamous and to miscegenous
marriages, both of which are punishable as felonies, and indicated
clearly that foreign miscegenous marriages would be considered
void as contrary to local public policy, just as the bigamous
marriage in the Toler case was held to be void.
Considering these statutes together with the Naim and Toler
decisions, it is submitted that the following marriages could be
voided:
(1) Any marriage performed in Virginia in which either
party has any trace whatsoever of non-Caucasian blood (other
than that of the American Indian), and the other party is Caucasian; 61
(2) Any marriage between parties domiciled within this
State who are married outside the State and return to Virginia,
where they cohabit as man and wife, when one of the parties has
62
any non-Caucasian blood;
61

Va. Code SS20-54 and 20-57 (1950).

42

Va. Code S§20-54, 20-57 and 20-58 (1950). See notes 48, 50 and S1 supra.
Nain v. Naim, see note 47 supra.

See notes 48 and 50 supra.

(3) Any marriage celebrated outside this State by non-residents of Virginia who later become domiciled in this State, when
one of the parties has any non-Caucasian blood;-6
(4) Lack of knowledge of the fact that one of the parties
has any trace of non-Caucasian blood will apparently be a defense to a criminal prosecution. 4 With such knowledge a prosecution may lie.65
The Supreme Court of Appeals refused to set aside the classification of races embodied in Code of Virginia §20-54 (1950),
relying on the presumption in favor of the validity of any legislative act until it is clearly shown to be arbitrary." This was a
proper application of a rule of construction. Any further action
can now come only from the General Assembly.
Since the enactment of Section 20-54 in 1924 our nation
has been engaged in one global conflict and one substantial "police
action." As a consequence of these conflicts, and the marriages
which resulted from American men serving overseas, the mores
and social attitudes of our society have changed to the extent that
at least some classes of miscegenous marriages are no longer
looked on with such disapprobation.
Within bounds, law may have a salutary effect in guiding
social attitudes and mores through the imposition of certain restraints on the actions of free men. But there is a delicate interrelationship between the customs and the laws in effect at a given
point of time. To the extent that a law is recognized as beneficial to the social organism, by promoting the greatest good for
the greatest number, it is a desirable law. But when the point is
reached where the fundamental mores and attitudes have so
changed that they are out of keeping with the law, then that law
should be re-evaluated to determine whether that law is still desirable.
63 Va. Code §§20-54 and 20-57 (1950), see notes 48 and 50 supra; Toler v.
Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp., see note 57 supra.
64Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp., see note 57 at 435.
6

1 Va. Code S20-59 (1950), see note 52 supra.
66 Martin's Ex'rs v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 603, 102 SE. 77 (1920); Bowman v. Virginia State Entomologist, 128 Va. 351, 105 S.E. 141 (1920);
Joy, et. al. v. Green, 194 Va. 1003, 76 S.E.2d 178 (1953); Bray v. County
Board, 195 Va. 31, 77 S.E.2d 479 (1953).

It is submitted that the point of re-evaluation has been
reached with respect to the classification of races found in Section 20-54. The legislative statement of public policy codified
therein has far-reaching implications today not contemplated by
the legislators when that statute was enacted. It is further submitted that this classification of the marriages deemed contrary
to Virginia's fundamental public policy should be reconsidered
by the General Assembly at this time with the thought of making
it less arbitrary.
William A. Hunt

